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Memorandum for [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] 25X1A9a

Subject: Staff Planning Project No. 26

So far as the Soviet orbit is concerned, my forecast through mid-1953 would be somewhat as follows:

1. The Kremlin's primary aim for the next two years will be the frustration of Western efforts to alter, in favor of the West, the world power balance.
2. In pursuit of this aim the Kremlin will strive to weaken and divide the non-Soviet world and to develop the military, economic, political and psychological position of the Soviet orbit.
3. In its attempt to weaken the non-Soviet world, the Kremlin's primary target will be the growing power and influence of the US. In attacking this target, the Kremlin probably will operate on several fronts simultaneously:
 - a. One phase of the Soviet effort will be aimed directly at influencing the US government. From time to time Soviet representatives will approach US officials with various proposals indicating a "sincere" Soviet desire to enter into big power discussions designed to ease international tension.
 - b. In view of the recent manifestations of official US firmness, however, and of the apparent determination of US leaders to pursue the present "containment" policy despite "conciliatory" Soviet gestures, the Kremlin hardly expects direct contact on the official level to

DOCUMENT NO. 112
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
☒ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 15 JAN 81

- 2 -

achieve major success. It will therefore pursue a second tactic aimed primarily at American public opinion. It will attempt to persuade the American voter that his government is demanding of him unnecessary inconvenience and hardship in its pursuit of the "containment" policy, and that a reasonable settlement of outstanding issues is possible. The Kremlin will hope that by thus appealing to US public opinion it can eventually bring about a change in US official policy.

c. A third aspect of Soviet policy will be designed to undermine US world leadership by isolating the US from its allies. Efforts will be made, through propaganda, diplomacy and perhaps the actual or threatened use of military force (on a limited scale), to force the US to act in opposition to the policies and desires of other non-Communist nations. The Kremlin will seek to persuade these nations that the firm policies of the US are the major cause of present tension, and that by supporting such policies they are aggravating the danger of major war and are inviting their own involvement in such a war. At the same time the Kremlin will attempt to win over, or at least to neutralize, various non-Communist states of Europe and Asia by offers of profitable trade. It will give special attention to former colonial areas, particularly in Asia, by exploiting the rising tide of Asian nationalism and by posing as a champion of Asian independence from Western "exploitation." It will stimulate in various Asian countries local strife and civil war under conditions where it will be militarily difficult and politically embarrassing

- 3 -

for the Western powers to intervene. By these methods it will seek to cut off from the West the resources and strategically important areas of the East, and it will hope that disturbances in Asia will cause the dissipation of Western resources and the sapping of Western strength in costly and inconclusive military operations.

4. While the dominant theme of Soviet propaganda and diplomacy throughout the operations mentioned above will be "peace", the threat of Soviet force will remain constantly in the background. This threat will be used to intimidate future victims of direct and indirect Communist aggression and to dissuade the West from intervening to check such aggression.

5. While pursuing the foregoing policies abroad, Kremlin efforts within the Soviet Orbit will be concerned with the continued development of the military, economic, political and psychological strength of the Communist world.

a. In the USSR itself present long-range programs will continue. The Soviet military establishment will be strengthened, modernized and probably somewhat expanded. Elaborate air defenses will be developed, and a strategic air arm probably will be created. The development of the Soviet economy, and particularly of strategic industry, will be continued. Considerable economic and industrial decentralization may be expected, and the creation of a series of more or less self-contained economic complexes across the Soviet Union--a sort of economic "defense in depth"--seems probable.

b. While these military and economic programs enjoy high priority already, and may even be accelerated, it is emphasized that they are

- 4 -

apparently long-range undertakings, and therefore are not expected to fluctuate sharply during the period here discussed. Politically, efforts to wipe out dissidence and disaffection within the Soviet orbit will continue, and recurring purges are likely. However, political factors, even including the possible death of Stalin, are not expected drastically to affect the policies of stability in the regime.

c. Throughout the Satellites the present program of military, economic and political development will continue. In Europe, Satellite forces are now being expanded at a considerable greater rate than are those of the USSR, and Satellite troops are receiving advanced training with the most modern weapons. This accelerated Satellite program may be intended in part to offset the prospective increased military strength of the NATO powers, and in part to prepare the Satellites to serve at some future date as "independent" agents of local communist aggression. In particular, the military and economic potential of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany may be developed, under strict Soviet control, into an integrated complex representing a Western outpost of Communist military strength.

d. In the Far East, the long term program for building up Communist military strength in Siberia and Communist China will continue. Efforts will be made to render the strategic-economic potential of the Soviet Far East more nearly independent of European Russia. In the absence of a serious rupture in Soviet-Chinese Communist relations, the Chinese Communists will bear the main burden of supporting Communist subversion and violence in South and Southeast Asia. The economy of China, and especially of Manchuria, will be built

- 5 -

up, and remote areas such as Sinkiang and Tibet will be opened up and their resources exploited. Kremlin plans for China will, however, insure that the Chinese economic and military potential remains partially dependent upon the USSR.

6. The Kremlin probably will hope and believe that the policies outlined above will succeed in their purpose, and that the present relative power position of the USSR can be maintained during the period under discussion. Even if the Soviet program is confronted with temporary setbacks, the Kremlin will hardly become desperate or seriously alarmed. But it is possible that, if present Western plans meet with optimum success, the Kremlin may, before the end of the period under discussion, conclude that its present policies were inadequate. It would then have to choose between resort to force, at least in local situations, with grave risk of general war, or major concessions and a temporary, though protracted, period of relatively peaceful "co-existence" with the West. In such a case, the latter course would appear more probable.

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